Building a USG Civilian Reserve for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

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“[We] will also work to **expand our use of civilian volunteers from outside our government**, who have the right skills and are willing to serve in these missions. After the liberation of Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans from all walks of life stepped forward to help these newly liberated nations recover. … These are ordinary Americans who are making unbelievable contributions to freedom’s cause. And the spirit of citizenship in this country is remarkable, and we’re going to put that spirit to work to advance the cause of liberty and to build a safer world.”

*President George W. Bush, May 18, 2005*

**NOTE:** President Requested $25 million in FY 07 to establish Civilian Reserve
National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44

“The Secretary of State shall be responsible for the following functions and may direct the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to assist the Secretary to:”

“(9) Lead United States Government development of a strong civilian response capability……and recommend additional authorities, mechanisms and resources needed to ensure that the United States has the civilian reserve and response capabilities necessary for stabilization and reconstruction activities to respond quickly and effectively.”
Civilian Response Mechanisms: Where does the Reserve fit in?

“First Responders” – Direct hires
1 week notice, 6 months deployable
State: Response Corps
  Active RC: dedicated, specially-trained
  Standby RC: pre-screened, trained, as available
Equivalent First Responders in partner agencies and bureaus
  AID – in process of strengthening
  Others – varying mechanisms to be strengthened
  NSPD calls for

“Civilian Reserve” – to become Federal R&S hires when mobilized
30 - 90 day notice, 1 year deployable
Skills not ordinarily in Fed Gov’t, performing gov’tal functions — police, rule of law, public services, civil administration, etc.

“Global Skills Network” – contractors w/ IQC, NGO and other arrangements
Longer lead time, can stay for years
Preexisting contracts, supervised by responsible agency or bureau
Improve current contracts to address gaps, speed, flexibility, skills
Why a Civilian Reserve?

**Rationale:**
- Reserve would complement USG civilian agency capacity
- “Just in time” surge capability is more cost effective than adding permanent USG staff
- Strong U.S. capacity will leverage parallel international and multilateral capacity
- Contracting networks pose reliability and command/control issues
- Military needs a civilian counterpart in order to phase down

**Principles:**
- Scalable – adjust size of call-up
- Modular – change the mix of sectoral emphasis to fit the situation
- Reliable – provides permanent, readily available trained civilian capability

**Key Elements:**
- Headquarters staff to manage and support
- Defined standards with vetting SOPs and training program
- Pre-positioned equipment and logistics capability
Civilian Reserve Model

Civilian Reservists would be:
- Specialists in fields of security, rule of law, essential services, and civil administration (followed by others in finance, economics, business development, health)
- Recruited from state, local, federal governments and private sector
- In current jobs until activated for annual training or deployment
- Rapidly deployed, individually or in formed units, within 30 days of call-up and remain in country for up to one year
- USG employees when on active status
- Paid comparable GS salary, plus wage incentives and allowances (e.g., to stay proficient in core foreign languages)
- Available to provide DOS surge capacity
- Followed by contracted personnel

Civilian Reservists would NOT Replace or Subsume Capabilities of:
- USG personnel and programs
- US based and local Implementing partners (contractors, NGOs)
- International Partners
- Faith Based Organizations
- Diaspora Networks
Multiple Needs, Multiple Tools

The Civilian Reserve concept will support and augment other USG capabilities in S/R operations. The Reserve will be focused on providing implementation capabilities on the ground.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism–SUPPLY</th>
<th>Function – DEMAND</th>
<th>S/CRS Staff</th>
<th>State Response Corps (Embassy)</th>
<th>Other USG Agencies &amp; Bureaus</th>
<th>Civilian Reserve</th>
<th>Global Skills Network (USG contracts, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Civilian Planning</td>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>Supplement</td>
<td>Participate</td>
<td>Supplement</td>
<td>Supplement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Washington Coordination</td>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>Supplement</td>
<td>Participate</td>
<td>Supplement</td>
<td>Supplement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>Field Diplomacy</td>
<td>Coordinate</td>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>Participate</td>
<td>Participate</td>
<td>Supplement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Program Mgmt. &amp; Design</td>
<td>Coordinate</td>
<td>Participate</td>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>Participate</td>
<td>Supplement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>Program Delivery</td>
<td>Monitor</td>
<td>Supplement</td>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>Rapid Response</td>
<td>Sustained Effort</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participate = Participate regularly
Supplement = Participate periodically as requested by lead
Leveraging International Partners

• **Key partners are developing civilian surge in and out of government**
  – EU & OSCE member states have rosters of experts
    • EU commitments: 5000 police, 200 judges, 200 rule of law experts, 200 civil administrators, 200 monitors
  – UN committed to Peace Building Commission, which will coordinate and make the most of national capacity and IFI contributions
  – Australia has created International Deployment Group (IDG) of National Police

• **These have some reliability problems**
  – Recruiting is ad hoc
  – Deployability and quality vary widely
  – EU & OSCE trying to standardize training
  – EU & OSCE experts are not obligated to respond

• **Organized U.S. reserve would support foreign policy goals**
  – Facilitates burden-sharing and leveraging of partners
  – Promotes interoperability and mutual reinforcement
  – Helps disseminate best practices and lessons learned
## Phased Development of “Reserves”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sectoral Focus</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Skills</th>
<th>Recruitment Targets (Cumulative)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| I     | FY2007 | Law and Order           | Transitional security and rule of law are *sine qua non* for post-conflict reconstruction; provide critical exit strategy for military | •Police  
   - Stability Police  
   - Organizational Advisors  
   • Police Trainers  
   • ROL Experts | FY07 Recruitment Targets:  
   600 Police  
   50 ROL  
   Total: 650 |
| II    | FY2008 | Essential Services      | Sustaining local support is dependent on providing electricity, water, and sanitation services, and emergency health | • Planners  
   • Civil, Electric, Water and Sanitation Engineers  
   • EMS | FY08 Cumulative Targets:  
   200 Services  
   1150 Police  
   150 ROL  
   Total: 1500 |
| III   | FY2009 | Civil Administration    | Effective, indigenous governance structures are central to creating sustainable political and economic development | • City Managers  
   • Records and Public Administration Advisors  
   • HR and Budget experts | FY09 Cumulative Targets:  
   200 Civil Adm.  
   500 Services  
   2000 Police  
   300 ROL  
   Total: 3000 |
Next Step: Define Requirements

A detailed management study to address:

• Levels of USG oversight and management
• Responsibilities of contractor to administer reserve
• Recruitment, vetting, selection of candidates
• Terms: Compensation, benefits and obligations
• Training and exercises
• Deployment needs—equipment, logistics
• Budgetary requirements
• Legislative requirements and proposal

First Draft due April 26; final draft May 28
### Fiscal Year Costs to Build and Deploy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># Reservists Recruited (cumulative total)</th>
<th>FY 07 Request</th>
<th>FY 08</th>
<th>FY 09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># Reservists Recruited</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost to Build Reserve</td>
<td>$11.0M</td>
<td>$15.1M</td>
<td>$26.8M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Reservists Prepared</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>1026</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost to Train and Equip Reservists</td>
<td>$8.9M</td>
<td>$23.3M</td>
<td>$40M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost to Manage / Oversee</td>
<td>$5.1M</td>
<td>$6.4M</td>
<td>$8.2M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Budget to Recruit, Train, Maintain</td>
<td>$25.0M</td>
<td>$44.8M</td>
<td>$75M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Estimated Cost to Deploy Reservists for one year:**
- 474 = $169.8M
- 1026 = $367.6M
- 1500 = $537.5M

**Recurrent annual cost to maintain 3000 member reserve = $46.3M**
Building a Standby Capability: Options Under Current Authorities

• **Within existing authorities we can:**
  – Hire through a number of contractual and other mechanisms such as Non-Career Appointments, Personal Services Contracts, Expert Consultants, “3161”, and others

• **All have limitations:**
  – Hard to recruit if no re-employment rights
  – May not be available when called-up
  – No enforceable obligation to train and deploy
  – Contractors may not represent USG or supervise USG employees
  – “3161” authority requires Executive Order
New Legislative Authorities Needed:

Would improve reliability, preparation, deployment speed, and accountability of personnel

**Requirements**

- **Personnel Authorities Establishing:**
  - Reemployment rights
  - Excepted service for appointments into USG
  - Liability protections and "privileges and immunities"

- **Funding Authorities to:**
  - Use Foreign Operations funds for administration and deployment of reserves
  - Obtain permanent flexible DoD transfer authority

**Challenges**

- **Flexibilities Limit Congressional Oversight**
  - Opposition to contingency funding and civilian surge capability
  - Concerns from Iraq experience: personnel, contracts

- **"Reserve" Name and Functions Problematic**
  - Creation of civilian capacity suggests plan to use it—fear of preemptive planning and long occupation

- **Unlikely to Garner Public Sympathy for Civilian Reserves**
  - Business lobby unlikely to support reemployment rights

Note: would still have limited enforcement of deployment obligations (removal from reserves; repayment of training costs)