Discussion of Standards, Metrics and Models for SwA
Breakout report Out

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Industry insights and ongoing assurance efforts

❑ How has industry defined the problem?
  » Application security
  » Network security
  » Defense-in-depth
  » Specific industry techniques, e.g., Securities Industry (stock markets)
  » Software Quality Assurance
  » Voluntary use of best practices
  » Gradual improvement
  » Fix vulnerabilities as discovered/uncovered
    • Effectiveness of patch management
    • Seek and destroy vulnerabilities
  » Unless contract has a contract specification for security, will not address (lacking ROI)
  » Quality Metric: "world class" considered 1 defect /1KLOC; therefore, defect count ≈ code size
  » Industry averse to construct of levels of goodness
    • Common Criteria-like construct leaves bad taste
    • Does not like to be judged on qualitative basis
    • Assurance measures vary in time and product

Bottom Line: No consensus on definition or magnitude of problem and inadequate incentives

Industry insights and ongoing assurance efforts

❑ **What are Industry strategies and best practices?**
  » CLASP Methodology – Secure Software Co.
  » MS Security Development Lifecycle (SDL)
  » UML Sec
  » TSP Secure
  » Smart Card
  » Model Driven Architecture (MDA)
  » Aspect Oriented Software Development (AOSD)
  » CMMI
  » Product Evlauation
  » Peer review
  » Threat Modeling
  » Source Code Scanning
  » Automated Security Testing (Commercial & Open Source Tools)
    • Penetration testing
    • Fuzz testing
  » ISO/IEC 15026 re-write
    • Plan assurance activities
    • Establish and maintain assurance arguments
    • Monitor and measure performance at system level

Bottom Line: Many techniques and tools & common practices, but no consensus on one set of best practices on this topic

Industry insights and ongoing assurance efforts

❑ What are lessons learned?

» Market driven by customers

» Customers don't always agree

» Customer may not understand up front all of the security implications

» Out-side in vice inside out solutions

» Inappropriate to apply/rely on a network security model to software

» Can get better

Bottom Line: Organizational change is hard. When we can get behavior changed product improvement results

Industry Thoughts Regarding DoD Strategy Elements

❑ Vet each strategy element, e.g., identify barriers

❑ Flesh out the detailed strategy plans and products

❑ Identify Industry Enablers, e.g., IR&D, Methodologies, Processes

Recommended actions for continued collaboration

❑ Deserves more time and effort

❑ Need an acquisition model to incentives needed behavior

❑ Need to identify a named group that meets regularly (frequently) to engage. Already have two that may be relevsant

  » DoD/DHS WG"Practices and Processes" DoD/DHS WG

  » DoD/DHS WG "Product Evaluation Tools and Technology" Need