



#### Health of the Industry

National Defense Industrial Association 2005 Munitions Executive Summit "Adapting for Battlefield Success" Washington D.C.

February 11, 2005

Pierre A. Chao
Senior Fellow and Director Defense-Industrial Initiatives
202-775-3128
pchao@csis.org





# "Strengthening the Core" – Health of the Industry Some Central Principles

- "Is the industry healthy?" the wrong question, cannot give a valid answer – too varied, too complex
- US remains a global power with global responsibilities and faces a wide range of potential threats – full spectrum capabilities needed
- Technological superiority remains a pillar of US strategy/strength
- As long as you have a defense budget, will have a defense industry
- Industry is very adaptable, responds to its environment and survives. The key issue is whether industry's survival strategies match the goals of government policymaker





# How To Think Through Complex Set of Industrial Base Issues

- One size does not fit all
  - Where are you on the industry life cycle
  - What tier


War versus peace

Look for the disconnects





## From the Industry Lifecycle Standpoint...




• Industry issues "bar belled" – in the S&T and sustain





### How To Redeploy Assets To Meet New Threats...



How/where to redeploy assets?

QDR will try to address...

# DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL INITIATIVES GROUP



## The QDR...

VULNERABILITY

Lower

- First post-911 QDR
- Strategy documents created and able to inform QDR

#### **Irregular**

Erode US influence and power by employing unconventional or irregular methods (terrorism, insurgency, civil war, etc.)

#### **Traditional**

Challenge US power by instigating traditional military operations with legacy and advanced military capabilities (conventional, established nuclear powers)

Catastrophic

Paralyze US leadership and power by employing WMD or WMD-like effects in unwarned attacks on symbolic, critical or other high value targets (9/11, terrorist use of WMD, rogue missile attack)

#### **Disruptive**

Usurp US power and influence by acquiring breakthrough capabilities (IT, biotech, nanotech, cyber-operations, space, directed energy, etc.)


Higher

Lower LIKELIHOOD





## Irregular Threats...



#### **Historically**

- Solved with Traditional forces
- SOCOM (\$6.5 billion budget)

#### **Issues**

- What role for non-military or DoD solutions?
- What is the role of allies in manpower intensive tasks?
- Are there viable technical solutions?


#### **Going Forward**

- Expanded SOCOM
- Constabulatory forces (new role or new force)
- Non-lethal technologies
- More precise and discriminating strike technologies





## Catastrophic Threats...



#### **Historically**

**Issues** 

- Rely on distance
- Rely on intel agencies
- What is your strategy try to prevent/disrupt ahead, try to stop, try to absorb
- What is the role of DoD versus DHS?


#### **Going Forward**

- Intelligence (IT, knowledge management, etc)
- Missile defense (Cruise missile defense)
- Sensors (wide and narrow area), security technologies, lot of low tech networked together
- Biodefense





## Disruptive Threats...



#### Historically

- We've been the disruptor
- Addressed with government S&T
- Is reliance on harvesting commercial technologies creating vulnerabilities?
- Globalization of technology

#### **Going Forward**


- Smaller, smarter, cheaper weapons
- Cyber-operations targeting single points of failure
- Challenge for industry and USG is "Innovators Dilemma"





# The Central Question...

• How to reallocate a fixed amount of resources ("resource neutral") - how much, to where, etc.








# Problem Exacerbated by Pressures On Defense Budget. . . Growth in Personnel Costs ramping up

- End Strength Growth
- Exploding Health Care Costs

**DoD Medical Spending According to CBO** 








# The Operations and Maintenance "Death Spiral"

Still With Us




	1990 (Avg Age)	2005 (Avg Age)
Ground Combat Vehicles	~ 6 yrs	~14 yrs
Marine Combat Vehicles	~ 5 yrs	~ 15 yrs
AF Fighters	~ 10 yrs	~ 18 yrs
Navy Aircraft	~ 11 yrs	~ 14 yrs
AF Bombers	~ 21 yrs	~ 30 yrs
AF Tankers	~ 27 yrs	~ 42 yrs
Combat Ships	~ 16 yrs	~ 16 yrs
Marine Helos	~ 17 yrs	~ 24 yrs

- Old equipment increasingly more expensive to maintain
- Iraqi War costs adding to the operations & maintenance bill






## This Has Been an O&M Cycle...







## From the Industry Lifecycle Standpoint...




- Drop in S&T/IR&D
- Scientific human capital
- Accessing non-defense tech
- Not enough focus on process innovation – complex systems and software

- Growing single points of failure in 2/3<sup>rd</sup> tier
- Asset intensive, low volume
- Surge
- Reallocation of work/capacity
- Not enough focus on process
   innovation flexible manufacturing







**Current Problem – We are in Two Modes!** 





## Areas of Policy Disconnect...

- Due to Landscape Changes
  - End Cold War, Post 911
  - Post consolidation
  - Era of joint
  - More sophisticated financial markets meets pure play defense
- Misapplied Policies
  - Competition everywhere
  - Efficiency everywhere
  - Hardware models applied to software/service
  - Answering complexity with centralization
- Conflicting Policies
  - Competition vs Buy America
  - Structural (Pendulum Swings)
    - Oversight vs efficiency
    - Civilian vs military






### **EXTRA SLIDES**





## Industry Has Four Key Levers To Create Value








## Defense Industry Margins Have Improved BUT...

**CSIS** Defense Index Average Operating Margin (weighted by revenue)








## The Industry Does Not Operate in a Vacuum...

• What are the alternative investments when you consider the defense sector?








### Defense Returns Improved, But Lowest Relative to Peers...

**Industry Average Operating Margin (weighted by revenue)** 



Sources: FactSet, S&P Compustat, Energy Information Administration, CSIS Analysis

Notes: 1) CSIS Defense Index comprises 36 publicly-traded companies with majority revenues derived from US defense business.

(2) S&P Sub-sector constituents accurate back to 1994; composition held constant for years 1980 to 1993.





#### Conventional Wisdom


- Defense industry SHOULD have lower returns than peers because:
  - Defense industry has lower risk
  - Pentagon pays for "everything"
  - R&D and assets paid for
  - Industry has long term contracts and the FYDP
  - No one allowed to fail





### More Volatility Than Conventional Wisdom...

#### **Industry Revenue Volatility 1980-2003**



Sources: FactSet, S&P Compustat, Energy Information Administration, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2004, CSIS Analysis Notes: 1) CSIS Defense Index comprises 36 publicly-traded companies with majority revenues derived from US defense business. Boeing Military revenues have also been included here.


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## Apparent Risk-Reward Disconnect in the Defense Business..

Industry Revenue Volatility versus Average Operating Margin 1980-2003 (weighted by revenue)







### Policy Realities Leave Industry With Few Levers to Pull...





SO...Work the Volatility/Risk Side of the Relationship





## Industry Strategies Generally Limited...

Growth (Revenues)



- Acquire it (hit a limit as well)
- Expand into O&M/services

Competitive Advantage Period - Disrupted by technology shifts

- Acquire IT/electronics/ architecture skills

Cash margins ("return")

- Cut costs

- Cut investments

- Eventually hit the margin glass ceiling

**Invested Capital** 

- One of few areas with running room
- Continue to shrink invested capital
- keep capx low, acquire and consolidate, give capital back






## Fewer Opportunities, Low Returns..Cut IR&D

Get out of S&T, Acquire it instead, Outsource it

#### Industry Internal R&D to Sales (weighted by revenue)




Sources: FactSet, S&P Compustat, CSIS





#### Shrink The Cold War Asset Base...

#### **Capital Expenditure to Depreciation**



Sources: FactSet, S&P Compustat, CSIS Analysis

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
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#### Financial Response to the Policy and Market Realities...

**Defense Industry Cash Outflows** 







## Industry "Returned To the Line" Via Acquisition and Cuts in Investment/Capital ...

**Industry Revenue Volatility versus Cash Flow Return on Investment** (HOLT CFROI) 1987-2003 (weighted by invested capital)

