

# **Wireless LAN Security**

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### Agenda

### 802.11 Standards


- WLAN Security Solutions
- WLAN Design Concepts
- Conclusion



### WLAN – Changing how we Work, Live Play and, Learn

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#### **In-Building Wireless LANs**



#### **Public Access Hot Spots**



#### **Campus Networking**



#### **Home Networking**



# **Comparing 802.11 Standards**

- 802.11b
- 2.4Ghz
- 11Mb (auto stepdown)
- Available today
- WiFi Interoperability
- Security WEP, WPA 802.11i (Q12004)
- Cisco Aironet 340/350/1100/1200



- 802.11a
- 5 Ghz
- 54Mb (auto stepdown)
- Available today
- WiFi Interoperability
- Security WEP, WPA 802.11i (Q1 2004)

- 802.11g
- Cisco.com

- 2.4Ghz
- 54 Mb (auto stepdown)
- **Ratified June 2003**
- Compatible w/802.11b
- Security WEP, WPA 802.11i (Q1 2004)
- **Cisco Products Q4CY03**
- Cisco Aironet 1200
- **Cisco Aironet 1200, 1100**



Aironet 1200



Aironet 1100

### **WLAN Security Overview & Directions**

- Network Security
- WLAN Security Issues
- WLAN Security Components
- IPSec WLANs




### WLAN Security is not an End Point It's a Journey!

- There are solutions to today's threats
- There will be threats to today's solutions
- Many security issues can be resolved by awareness, good implementation & good design



# Key Components of a Secure Network Wired or Wireless



### **802.11 WLAN Security Issues**

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### Authentication

Data Privacy



# IEEE 802.11 Security – Authentication (Pre WPA)


Open – No Authentication

Issue – Anyone can be authenticated

• Shared – Use WEP Key to encrypt AP Challenge

**Issue – Easy to determine WEP Key** 

- Assumed Authentication Methods SSID, MAC Address
   Issue SSID Association, never intended for security
   Issue MAC Sent in clear, very easily spoofed
- Published Papers University of Maryland, April 2001



### IEEE 802.11 Security – Data Privacy (Pre WPA)

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Wired Equivalency Privacy

Based on RC4 Algorithm (good algorithm)

Weak Implementation (Weak IV, IV sent in clear, common WEP key

### Issues (Based on WEP implementation)

Weak IV – FMS Paper, July 2001


Key Derivation via monitoring - AirSnort

Key Derivation via bit flipping – UC Berkley, Feb. 2001

IV & WEP Key Replay Attack - DoS, knowing IV & WEP

No Key Management – Lends to invasion

WiFi Interoperability Certification – 40 bit only



### WLAN Security Components (WPA & 802.11i)

- Authentication Framework (802.1X)
- Authentication Algorithm (EAP)
- Data Encryption Algorithm (TKIP, AES)



# WLAN Security Standards

- IEEE 802.11 TGi Proposed Standard 802.11i IEEE Task Group focused on WLAN Security Improvement Enhancement Proposed - 802.1X, EAP, TKIP, MIC, AES Expected Ratification – Q4CY03 http://www.ieee.org
- WECA Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance

"Compatibility "Seal of Approval" WiFi Interoperability "WiFi" – WLAN Interoperability CY2000 WiFi Protected Access (WPA) – 802.1X, EAP, TKIP, MIC Accepted January 2003, Testing started February 2003

http://www.weca.net

**FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standard** 

Not specific for WLAN but does have implications for encrypting data sent over WLAŃs

FIPS

#### **Regulated by NIST**

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html

http://www-08.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-48/NIST\_SP\_800-48.pdf - Federal WLAN Presentation\_IGUIGE01, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.





Federal Information Processing Standards Computer Security Resource Center - CSD



### FIPS Certification & Standards Implementation

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• What FIPS 140-1/2 does:

Certification of Encryption Algorithm(s) & Modes DES, 3DES, AES – only certain modes of these algorithms


• What FIPS 140-1/2 does not do:

Certification of implementation standards (ie IEEE or IETF)

 Therefore proprietary FIPS approved solutions exist

FIPS Certified IPSec and 802.11i (when ratified) solutions offer open standards based, government certified solutions

WPA probably will never be FIPS certified



WEP Key never sent over the wire, derived by end station & Authentication server

# 802.11i & WPA Encryption Algorithms

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• Static WEP – Not recommended

(especially for Enterprise Configurations)

Dynamic WEP - Hardened WEP Session Keys - WPA

**Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)** 

- Reduce IV attack, strengthen key integrity

**Message Integrity Check (MIC)** 

- Prevent Replay attack, authenticity of frame
- Alternative to WEP-RC4 802.11i

**Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)** 


- As strong as 3DES, faster computation, FIPS 140-2 direction (NIST & IEEE)

- Currently DES nor 3DES supported as a data privacy algorithm in any 802.11 direction

### **IPSec WLAN**



# **IPSec VPN**



End to End security

IPSec VPN – Layer 3 – Client to Concentrator Haul back to Central Point of Data Privacy Stronger Data Encryption (3DES, AES) – today Standards based – RFC 2401 Can be implemented on top of Layer 2 WLAN Part of a Defense in Depth approach


# Additional benefits of IPSec VPNs

- Can be used for wired & wireless
   Remote Access (Cable)
   Dial-In (RAS)
   Traffic separation (Communities of Interests)
- Same software for wired & wireless
   Usability, Support, Cost benefits

# **WLAN Design Concepts**



### Design Security Reducing Bandwidth Coverage



- 11 Mbps connections only (or on edges of perimeter only)
- Can also reduce the radio power to reduce coverage area

# **OSI Layer & WLAN Security**

**IPSec – Network Layer** User ID **Application** Password IETF Standards (RFC 2401) **Presentation** IP URL DES, 3DES, AES Session Filtering WLAN – Data Link ACLs Transport SSL IEEE Standards (802.11) ACLS Network Ethernet WEP (RC4) ACLS Data Link WEP "Alternative" (AES) **Physical** 


### Lends to Defense in Depth Approach

# **Conceptual View**


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#### **Configuration A**


#### **Configuration B**




# **WLAN Security Enclave**




# **802.11 Wireless Mobility**



### **Wireless IPSec**



# 802.11i with AES Design



### Different Users, Different Access – Common WLAN

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**Cisco Secure ACS 3.1** 


#### Authentication via EAP for all users

- Group 1 (Internal WLAN Users)
   IPSec VPN, Dynamic WEP, VLAN 100
- Group 2 (Scanner & Special Applications)

No VPN, Dynamic WEP, VLAN 200

Group 3 (Visiting Users)

EAP (guest access or registration), No VPN, Internet Access ONLY, VLAN 300



### Conclusion



### **Recommendations for WLAN Security**

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Change product defaults

Unique SSID, turn off SSID broadcast, WEP Key (128 bit), userid/password on AP

- Tie WLAN into your Organizational Security Policy
- Site Survey Know your environment, understand your implementation and goals

Antennas Types, Association Parameters (Data Rate, Power, MAC Address), AP Placement

Separate network for WLAN

Firewall and IDS before entering private LAN, separate infrastucture or VLAN & IP Addresses.

Defense in Depth Approach

Layer 2 – WPA, 802.11i, Layer 3 – VPNs

**Boundary Protection – IDS, Firewalls** 

Interoperability - Standards based, FIPS-140



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Wireless is here to stay

Enables new applications, new enterprise

Security not just a WLAN issue – a <u>Network</u> issue
 Treat the network as an untrusted network and secure

appropriately

WLAN can be extremely secure

No quick fixes – planning and design

Solutions to address security are available today and will continue to evolve

# **Cisco WLAN Security Links**

Cisco WLAN Security website

http://www.cisco.com/go/aironet/security

- Cisco Wireless Security Suite software downloading instructions
   <u>http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/pd/witc/ao350ap/prodlit/1674\_pp.htm</u>
- SAFE: Wireless LAN Security in Depth

http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/so/cuso/epso/sqfr/safwl\_wp.htm

Cisco Mobile Office: At Work (Click on - Technology Overview)

http://www.cisco.com/go/atwork



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# **Other IEEE 802.11 Standard Activities**



- 802.11a—5 GHz, ratified in 1999
- 802.11b—11Mb 2.4 GHz, ratified in 1999
- 802.11g—Higher Datarate at 2.4 GHz
- 802.11e—Quality of Service
- 802.11f—Inter-Access Point Protocol (IAPP)
- 802.11h—Dynamic Channel Selection and Transmit Power Control mechanisms
- 802.11i—Authentication and Security

### 802.1X & EAP

### 802.1X – IEEE Authentication Framework Originally designed for wired networks, used (natively) for WLAN Supplicant – Client (software on mobile device) Authenticator – AP Authentication Server – RADIUS

• EAP – Authentication Protocol (RFC2284)

Works inside the 802.1X Authentication Framework

802.11i does not stipulate any authentication algorithm

Cisco EAP, EAP-TLS, EAP-SIM (GSM), PEAP (Hybrid), Others

• EAP –

**Mutual Authentication** 

WLAN authenticates the client, client authenticates the WLAN Dynamic WEP Key Generation

Unique WEP Key per authenticated user

### **WLAN Data Transmission**

Dynamic Session Key

Used for encryption of data, unique to each authenticated user

Derived independently by client and authentication server

Session key sent to AP over wired network

**Session Key never sent over wireless network** 

Timeout & renegotiate session keys – Cisco Value Add

Optional but recommended (hourly good idea)

# 802.11, WPA, 802.11i Comparison

Feature	Authentication	Encryption	Comments
Open Authentication	$\checkmark$		802.11
Shared Authentication	$\checkmark$		802.11
802.1X	$\checkmark$		WPA/802.11i
EAP	$\checkmark$		WPA/802.11i
WEP 40/128bit		$\checkmark$	802.11/WiFi
Dynamic Encryption Key		$\checkmark$	WPA/802.11i
WEP-TKIP (128 Bit)		$\checkmark$	WPA/802.11i
МІС		$\checkmark$	WPA/802.11i
AES		$\checkmark$	802.11i

# Additional Cisco Value Add Features

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### **AP** Authentication

Rogue Access Point Detection

### Per-packet hashing


Change WEP key per packet

### **Broadcast key rotation**

 Change WEP Key for broadcast and multicast

#### Publicly Secure Packet Forwarding (PSPF)

#### Prevent client to client communication in a WLAN




**PSPF** 

# **IPSec VPN Design Ideas**

- "Dummy" network WLAN
  - Unique IP address range (ie 10.0.0)
  - Not routed outside WLAN perimeter
  - Only devices on network are APs
- After VPN Authentication
  - Client assigned valid IP address (in IPSec tunnel)


Special IP range just for WLAN users (ie 168.94.100.0/24)



### Initial IEEE 802.11 Security – Data Privacy How 802.11 WEP Encryption Works

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#### **Random Number Generator (24 bits)**



**MAC Addresses** 

# 802.11i Encryption Algorithms

